The shape of AI regulation is beginning to emerge, most prominently through the EU AI Act (the "AIA"). By 2027, the AIA will be in full effect, and firms are starting to adjust their behavior in light of this new law. In this paper, we present a framework and taxonomy for reasoning about "avoision" -- conduct that walks the line between legal avoidance and evasion -- that firms might engage in so as to minimize the regulatory burden the AIA poses. We organize these avoision strategies around three "tiers" of increasing AIA exposure that regulated entities face depending on: whether their activities are (1) within scope of the AIA, (2) exempted from provisions of the AIA, or are (3) placed in a category with higher regulatory scrutiny. In each of these tiers and for each strategy, we specify the organizational and technological forms through which avoision may manifest. Our goal is to provide an adversarial framework for "red teaming" the AIA and AI regulation on the horizon.

AI-generated images have become so good in recent years that individuals cannot distinguish them any more from "real" images. This development creates a series of societal risks, and challenges our perception of what is true and what is not, particularly with the emergence of "deep fakes" that impersonate real individuals. Watermarking, a technique that involves embedding identifying information within images to indicate their AI-generated nature, has emerged as a primary mechanism to address the risks posed by AI-generated images. The implementation of watermarking techniques is now becoming a legal requirement in many jurisdictions, including under the new 2024 EU AI Act. Despite the widespread use of AI image generation systems, the current status of watermarking implementation remains largely unexamined. Moreover, the practical implications of the AI Act's watermarking requirements have not previously been studied. The present paper therefore both provides an empirical analysis of 50 of the most widely used AI systems for image generation, and embeds this empirical analysis into a legal analysis of the AI Act. We identify four categories of generative AI image systems relevant under the AI Act, outline the legal obligations for each category, and find that only a minority number of providers currently implement adequate watermarking practices.

The "right to be forgotten" and the data privacy laws that encode it have motivated machine unlearning since its earliest days. Now, an inbound wave of artificial intelligence regulations - like the European Union's Artificial Intelligence Act (AIA) - potentially offer important new use cases for machine unlearning. However, this position paper argues, this opportunity will only be realized if researchers, aided by policymakers, proactively bridge the (sometimes sizable) gaps between machine unlearning's state of the art and its potential applications to AI regulation. To demonstrate this point, we use the AIA as an example. Specifically, we deliver a "state of the union" as regards machine unlearning's current potential for aiding compliance with the AIA. This starts with a precise cataloging of the potential applications of machine unlearning to AIA compliance. For each, we flag any legal ambiguities clouding the potential application and, moreover, flag the technical gaps that exist between the potential application and the state of the art of machine unlearning. Finally, we end with a call to action: for both machine learning researchers and policymakers, to, respectively, solve the open technical and legal questions that will unlock machine unlearning's potential to assist compliance with the AIA - and other AI regulation like it.

What constitutes a fair decision? This question is not only difficult for humans but becomes more challenging when Artificial Intelligence (AI) models are used. In light of discriminatory algorithmic behaviors, the EU has recently passed the AI Act, which mandates specific rules for AI models, incorporating both traditional legal non-discrimination regulations and machine learning based algorithmic fairness concepts. This paper aims to bridge these two different concepts in the AI Act through: First a high-level introduction of both concepts targeting legal and computer science-oriented scholars, and second an in-depth analysis of the AI Act's relationship between legal non-discrimination regulations and algorithmic fairness. Our analysis reveals three key findings: (1.), most non-discrimination regulations target only high-risk AI systems. (2.), the regulation of high-risk systems encompasses both data input requirements and output monitoring, though these regulations are often inconsistent and raise questions of computational feasibility. (3.) Regulations for General Purpose AI Models, such as Large Language Models that are not simultaneously classified as high-risk systems, currently lack specificity compared to other regulations. Based on these findings, we recommend developing more specific auditing and testing methodologies for AI systems. This paper aims to serve as a foundation for future interdisciplinary collaboration between legal scholars and computer science-oriented machine learning researchers studying discrimination in AI systems.

The rapid proliferation and deployment of General-Purpose AI (GPAI) models, including large language models (LLMs), present unprecedented challenges for AI supervisory entities. We hypothesize that these entities will need to navigate an emergent ecosystem of risk and incident reporting, likely to exceed their supervision capacity. To investigate this, we develop a simulation framework parameterized by features extracted from the diverse landscape of risk, incident, or hazard reporting ecosystems, including community-driven platforms, crowdsourcing initiatives, and expert assessments. We evaluate four supervision policies: non-prioritized (first-come, first-served), random selection, priority-based (addressing the highest-priority risks first), and diversity-prioritized (balancing high-priority risks with comprehensive coverage across risk types). Our results indicate that while priority-based and diversity-prioritized policies are more effective at mitigating high-impact risks, particularly those identified by experts, they may inadvertently neglect systemic issues reported by the broader community. This oversight can create feedback loops that amplify certain types of reporting while discouraging others, leading to a skewed perception of the overall risk landscape. We validate our simulation results with several real-world datasets, including one with over a million ChatGPT interactions, of which more than 150,000 conversations were identified as risky. This validation underscores the complex trade-offs inherent in AI risk supervision and highlights how the choice of risk management policies can shape the future landscape of AI risks across diverse GPAI models used in society.

Traditional safety engineering assesses systems in their context of use, e.g. the operational design domain (road layout, speed limits, weather, etc.) for self-driving vehicles (including those using AI). We refer to this as downstream safety. In contrast, work on safety of frontier AI, e.g. large language models which can be further trained for downstream tasks, typically considers factors that are beyond specific application contexts, such as the ability of the model to evade human control, or to produce harmful content, e.g. how to make bombs. We refer to this as upstream safety. We outline the characteristics of both upstream and downstream safety frameworks then explore the extent to which the broad AI safety community can benefit from synergies between these frameworks. For example, can concepts such as common mode failures from downstream safety be used to help assess the strength of AI guardrails? Further, can the understanding of the capabilities and limitations of frontier AI be used to inform downstream safety analysis, e.g. where LLMs are fine-tuned to calculate voyage plans for autonomous vessels? The paper identifies some promising avenues to explore and outlines some challenges in achieving synergy, or a confluence, between upstream and downstream safety frameworks.

There is an urgent need to identify both short and long-term risks from newly emerging types of Artificial Intelligence (AI), as well as available risk management measures. In response, and to support global efforts in regulating AI and writing safety standards, we compile an extensive catalog of risk sources and risk management measures for general-purpose AI (GPAI) systems, complete with descriptions and supporting examples where relevant. This work involves identifying technical, operational, and societal risks across model development, training, and deployment stages, as well as surveying established and experimental methods for managing these risks. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first of its kind to provide extensive documentation of both GPAI risk sources and risk management measures that are descriptive, self-contained and neutral with respect to any existing regulatory framework. This work intends to help AI providers, standards experts, researchers, policymakers, and regulators in identifying and mitigating systemic risks from GPAI systems. For this reason, the catalog is released under a public domain license for ease of direct use by stakeholders in AI governance and standards.

The EU's Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act) is a significant step towards responsible AI development, but lacks clear technical interpretation, making it difficult to assess models' compliance. This work presents COMPL-AI, a comprehensive framework consisting of (i) the first technical interpretation of the EU AI Act, translating its broad regulatory requirements into measurable technical requirements, with the focus on large language models (LLMs), and (ii) an open-source Act-centered benchmarking suite, based on thorough surveying and implementation of state-of-the-art LLM benchmarks. By evaluating 12 prominent LLMs in the context of COMPL-AI, we reveal shortcomings in existing models and benchmarks, particularly in areas like robustness, safety, diversity, and fairness. This work highlights the need for a shift in focus towards these aspects, encouraging balanced development of LLMs and more comprehensive regulation-aligned benchmarks. Simultaneously, COMPL-AI for the first time demonstrates the possibilities and difficulties of bringing the Act's obligations to a more concrete, technical level. As such, our work can serve as a useful first step towards having actionable recommendations for model providers, and contributes to ongoing efforts of the EU to enable application of the Act, such as the drafting of the GPAI Code of Practice.

We live in a world that is experiencing an unprecedented boom of AI applications that increasingly penetrate and enhance all sectors of private and public life, from education, media, medicine, and mobility to the industrial and professional workspace, and -- potentially particularly consequentially -- robotics. As this world is simultaneously grappling with climate change, the climate and environmental implications of the development and use of AI have become an important subject of public and academic debate. In this paper, we aim to provide guidance on the climate-related regulation for data centers and AI specifically, and discuss how to operationalize these requirements. We also highlight challenges and room for improvement, and make a number of policy proposals to this end. In particular, we propose a specific interpretation of the AI Act to bring reporting on the previously unadressed energy consumption from AI inferences back into the scope. We also find that the AI Act fails to address indirect greenhouse gas emissions from AI applications. Furthermore, for the purpose of energy consumption reporting, we compare levels of measurement within data centers and recommend measurement at the cumulative server level. We also argue for an interpretation of the AI Act that includes environmental concerns in the mandatory risk assessment (sustainability risk assessment, SIA), and provide guidance on its operationalization. The EU data center regulation proves to be a good first step but requires further development by including binding renewable energy and efficiency targets for data centers. Overall, we make twelve concrete policy proposals, in four main areas: Energy and Environmental Reporting Obligations; Legal and Regulatory Clarifications; Transparency and Accountability Mechanisms; and Future Far-Reaching Measures beyond Transparency.

The AI act is the European Union-wide regulation of AI systems. It includes specific provisions for general-purpose AI models which however need to be further interpreted in terms of technical standards and state-of-art studies to ensure practical compliance solutions. This paper examines the AI act requirements for providers and deployers of general-purpose AI and further proposes uncertainty estimation as a suitable measure for legal compliance and quality assurance in training of such models. We argue that uncertainty estimation should be a required component for deploying models in the real world, and under the EU AI Act, it could fulfill several requirements for transparency, accuracy, and trustworthiness. However, generally using uncertainty estimation methods increases the amount of computation, producing a dilemma, as computation might go over the threshold ($10^{25}$ FLOPS) to classify the model as a systemic risk system which bears more regulatory burden.